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Abstract
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third
party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller?
Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a
clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection de-
vice, seller-induced certification as a signalling device. Seller-induced
certification maximizes the certifier’s profit and social welfare. This
suggests the general principle that certification is, and should be in-
duced by the better informed party. The results are reflected in a case
study from the automotive industry, but apply also to other markets
- in particular the financial market.
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1 Introduction
In many, if not most markets, the seller of a good knows better its quality than
the buyer. Often that seller cannot credibly convey it to the buyer. In this
case, an independent expert may be called for to certify the product’s quality.
In principle, there is demand for certification from both sides of the market.
The seller may ask for certification in order to sell at an appropriately high
price if the commodity is of high quality. The buyer may ask for certification
because she does not want to buy a low quality commodity at a high price.
So does it make a difference whether the buyer or the seller initiates
certification? The spontaneous answer seems no. We show, however, that it
does. The reason is that the economic role of certification differs drastically,
depending on whether the informed or the uninformed party initiates it.
Our question has both a positive and a normative component: Is it more
profitable for the certifier to sell its service to the seller, or the buyer? Is its
choice appropriate from a welfare point of view?
The answers to these questions are not obvious. It is unclear a priori to
whom certification is more valuable and therefore, from whom the certifier
can extract more rents. Moreover, it is unclear whether its rent extraction
leads to a socially desirable outcome.
Our answers are, nevertheless, unequivocal. Seller–induced certification
is more profitable to the certifier – and it is preferred from a welfare point of
view. Arriving at these answers is not trivial, because the economic role of
certification depends crucially on who initiates it. If the buyer wants to check
the seller’s claim about quality implicit in his price quotation, certification
plays the role of an inspection device. By contrast, if the seller wants to prove
high product quality to the buyer, certification induced by him plays the role
of a signalling device.
We identify and compare these two different roles of certification, and
show how they lead to two fundamentally different economic games. When
the buyer initiates certification, buyer and seller play an inspection game
with a typical mixed strategy equilibrium. The certifier then picks a price
for certification that maximizes its revenue in the mixed strategy equilibrium
of the subsequent inspection game. By contrast, when the seller initiates cer-
tification, the buyer and the seller play a signalling game. The certifier then
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also picks a certification price that maximizes its revenue, but the price must
ensure that certification is an effective signalling device in that it separates
high quality from low quality sellers. Hence, the certifier must not only en-
sure that the price of certification is low enough so that the high quality
producer wants to signal high quality via certification, but also high enough
so that the low quality seller does not find it worthwhile to buy certification
and mimic the high quality seller.
In our baseline analysis, extended and shown to be robust later, we show
that the equilibrium outcome in the signalling game is the more efficient one
relative to the equilibrium outcome in the inspection game. The reason is
that the mixed strategy equilibria of the inspection game yield two ineffi-
ciencies; first, certification is sometimes also demanded for the low quality
good; and second, the low quality good is not always traded. Hence, in the
inspection game, certification is sometimes wasteful, and gains from trade
are not always exhausted. By contrast, in the signaling game, certification is
demanded only if the good is of high quality, and the good is sold no matter
its quality, so gains from trade are fully exploited. We therefore conclude
that seller–induced certification is not only socially more desirable, but also
preferable to the certifier.
As to the literature on certification, Viscusi (1978) was the first to point
out formally that, in Akerlof’s (1970) lemons market, there exist gains of
trade for an external certifier, who reduces asymmetric information by pro-
viding quality certification.1 Biglaiser (1993) extends this result to a dynamic
adverse selection setting, and derives conditions under which an expert im-
proves upon welfare by taking possession of the good(s) and trading with the
typical buyer. Because the expert acts more as a middleman than as a certi-
fier, the model differs from ours. Faulhaber and Yao (1989) focus on how, in
a dynamic framework, the possibility of certification impacts concerns of rep-
utation. We do not address reputation. Albano and Lizzeri (2001) consider
a moral hazard problem and show how certification can provide the correct
incentives for the production of high but costly quality. Yet unlike in our
1See also De and Nabar (1991), who point out that inaccurate certification technologies
may yield quantitatively different results than the perfect certification framework as in
Viscusi (1978).
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model, the certifier sells, by assumption, only to the producer.
More in line with our research questions, Fasten and Hofmann (2010)
discuss the provision of certification to a buyer or a seller, but concentrate on
asymmetries in information disclosure: The seller wants public information,
the buyer private one. These issues do not arise in our context. Bouvard and
Levy (2009) show that in spite of reputation effects involved in certification,
the certifier does not necessarily fully disclose information, an aspect not
discussed in our comparison.
We follow the aforementioned literature in the assumption that certifiers
reveal honestly all their information. Yet there is also a literature on the
strategic disclosure of a certifier’s information and straight–out fraudulent
experts. Lizzeri (1999) focuses on the strategic manipulation of information
by a monopolistic certifier and shows that, in its quest of maximizing re-
turns, the certifier minimizes the amount of information provided. Guerra
(2001) demonstrates in a slightly modified version that more than a mini-
mal information serves that objective. Peyrache and Quesada (2004) extend
Lizzeri’s analysis of the strategic disclosure of information by certifiers, to
include reputation and differentiation effects between sellers.
Wolinsky (1993) shows how buyers’ search for multiple opinions disci-
plines fraudulent certifiers. Emons (1997) discusses whether in markets for
experts, the market mechanism induces non–fraudulent behavior. Strausz
(2004) discusses how reputation in a repeated game can induce non–fraudulent
behavior even if a seller can bribe a certifier to certify dishonestly. He also
shows that honest certification exhibits economies of scale and constitutes a
natural monopoly.2 While we can use the latter result in our model to jus-
tify our assumption of a certifier monopoly, this strand of literature is very
different in spirit and intention to ours.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section 2, we
describe the model. In Section 3, we derive the results for buyer–induced
certification. Section 4 contains the results for seller–induced certification
as well as the comparison between the two from the point of view of the
2See Hvide (2004) for a model with several certifiers, who compete in prices but are
ranked by the difficulty at which their test is passed. Broadly speaking the author shows
that the matching of sellers and certifiers is assortative.
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certifier. In Section 5 we evaluate that outcome from a welfare point of view.
Section 6 we discuss many extensions of our baseline model and show the
results to be robust. In Section 7 we discuss empirical examples involving
certification. Whilst the primary one is taken from upstream supplier–buyer
relationships in the automotive industry, there are many other applications
– in particular to the financial industry, with our results leading to a clear
policy recommendation. We summarize and conclude with Section 8. All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
Consider a seller offering one unit of a good at price p whose quality, before
certification, is revealed only to him and is unobservable to a buyer. From
the buyer’s point of view, the seller’s quality is high, qh, with probability λ
and low, ql > 0, with probability 1−λ, where ∆q ≡ qh− ql > 0.
3 The good’s
quality is identified with the buyer’s willingness to pay. The risk neutral
buyer is therefore willing to pay up to a price that equals expected quality
q¯ ≡ λqh + (1− λ)ql. If not buying at all, his reservation payoff is zero. The
high quality seller has a production cost ch > 0, and the low quality seller has
a production cost cl = 0. If not producing and selling the seller’s reservation
payoff is also zero.
We assume that the high quality good delivers higher economic rents:
qh − ch > ql − cl = ql > 0. Moreover, the cost of producing a high quality
product exceeds the average quality, ch > q¯. This creates a lemon’s problem
and leads to adverse selection: without certification, a high quality seller
would not offer his good to the market, and thus the market outcome with
informational asymmetry would be inefficient. Without the informational
asymmetry, however, the high quality seller could sell his good for the price
qh > ch. Consequently, the high quality seller has demand for certification
that reveals the good’s true quality to the buyer. Clearly, the high quality
seller is willing to pay the certifier at most qh − ch.
Yet the buyer has also demand for certification. Whenever the seller
3This implies that λ is bounded away from 1.
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quotes a price higher than that appropriate for the low quality good, the
buyer may demand certification ascertaining that the good has indeed high
quality, so that a higher price is justified.
Summarizing, both the buyer and the seller have a demand for certifi-
cation. For a monopolistic certifier this brings the question as to whom he
should offer his services.4 The certifier has the technology to perfectly detect
the seller’s quality at a cost cc ∈ [0, qh − ch) and to announce it publicly.
The certifier’s problem is as follows. In an initial stage (not modeled here
to keep matters as simple as possible), he has to decide whether to offer his
services to the buyer or the seller. After this decision, he sets a price pc at
which the buyer or the seller, respectively, can obtain certification. If not
offering certification at all, his reservation payoff is zero. We focus on honest
certification where the certifier cannot be bribed.
Our research question is twofold, namely whether the monopolistic certi-
fier is better off servicing the uninformed buyer or the informed seller, and
whether his decision conforms to the sum of consumer and producer sur-
plus, a standard welfare criterion. In order to answer these questions, we
separately study ”buyer–induced”, and ”seller–induced” certification, and
contrast their outcomes from both the certifier’s and a social welfare point
of view.
3 Buyer–Induced Certification
Here we consider the certification problem when induced by the buyer. Before
analyzing the formal model, it is helpful to provide an intuition on the role
of certification and the certifier’s motive in this setup.
Buyer–induced certification enables the buyer to check the seller’s qual-
ity claim. In particular, certification offers the buyer protection against a
4For obvious reasons, the certifier cannot sell to both parties at the same time. In
Section 7, we consider empirical cases exactly reflecting this structure.
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low quality seller who pretends to have high quality. From the buyer’s per-
spective, therefore, certification is an inspection device to detect low quality
sellers.
The game underlying buyer–induced certification, therefore, is an inspec-
tion game. A mixed strategy equilibrium is typical for this type of game.
Indeed, a pure strategy equilibrium in which the buyer never buys certifica-
tion cannot exist, because it would give the low quality seller an incentive
to claim high quality – yet against this claim the buyer would have a strong
incentive to buy certification. Likewise, an equilibrium in which the buyer
always buys certification cannot exist either, because it keeps the low quality
seller from claiming high quality – yet against such behavior certification is
only wasteful for the buyer. Consequently, we typically have a mixed strategy
equilibrium, where the low quality seller cheats with some probability and
claims to offer high quality, and the buyer certifies with some probability
when the seller claims to have high quality.
Hence, buyer–induced certification plays the role of reducing cheating.
The buyer’s demand for certification will therefore be high when the problem
of cheating is large. This reasoning suggests that a monopolistic certifier, who
targets his services towards the buyer, will choose a certification price that
maximizes the buyer’s cheating problem.
A closer look reveals that the buyer’s cheating problem depends on two
factors: the buyer’s uncertainty and the seller’s price quotation. First, the
buyer’s cheating problem is the bigger the less certain she is about the true
quality offered by the seller. Second, checking true quality through certifi-
cation is especially worthwhile for intermediate prices of the good. Indeed,
for a low price the buyer would not lose much from simply buying the good
uncertified. By contrast, when the price is high, the buyer would not lose
much from not buying the good at all. Hence, the buyer’s willingness to pay
for certification is largest for intermediate prices that are neither too low nor
too high.
To sum up, our intuitive reasoning suggests that under buyer–induced
certification a monopolistic certifier will choose his price for certification, pc,
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so that it induces high uncertainty for the buyer and an intermediate price
for the good. With the ensuing formal analysis we show that this intuition
is correct, yet not trivial at all.
With buyer–induced certification, the parties play the following game:
t=1 The certifier sets a price pc for his service.
t=2 Nature selects the quality qi, i ∈ {l, h}, of the good offered, and conveys
it to the seller.
t=3 The seller offering the good of quality qi at cost ci decides about the
price p at which he offers the good.
t=4 The buyer decides whether or not to demand certification of the good.
t=5 The buyer decides whether or not to buy the good.
Note that we assume that if the seller qi sets a price in stage 3, he incurs
the production cost ci for sure, even though the buyer may decide not to
buy the good in stage 5. This assumption is natural under several forms of
certification.
First, certification may mean that the certifier inspects the actual good
the buyer is interested in. In this case, the good must already be produced
in order for the certifier to inspect it, and the seller must therefore have
incurred the production cost even if the buyer decides not to acquire it. A
second possibility is that the certifier determines the seller’s product quality
by inspecting his production facility, and certifying his production technol-
ogy. In this case, the production cost ch may be interpreted as a fixed cost
that differs between high and low quality sellers. Under both interpreta-
tions, the seller incurs the cost even if the buyer, in the end, does not buy
the product.
We focus on the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of the game described
above. Note that after the certifier has set its price pc, a proper subgame,
Γ(pc), starts with nature’s decision about the quality of the seller’s product.
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The subgame Γ(pc) is a signalling game where the seller’s price p may or may
not reveal his private information about the quality of the good.
In the subsequent analysis, we first consider the PBE of the subgame
Γ(pc). A PBE specifies three components: First, the seller’s pricing strategy
as a function of the good’s type qi; second, the buyer’s belief µ(p) after
observing the price p; third, the buyer’s behavior; in particular whether or
not to buy certification and the actual good.
We allow the seller to randomize over prices. In order to circumvent
measure–theoretical complications, we assume that the seller can randomize
over an infinite but countable set. Consequently, we can express the strategy
of the seller of quality qi by the function σi : R+ → [0, 1] with the interpreta-
tion that σi(pj) denotes the probability that the seller with quality qi chooses
the price pj. Thus, for both i ∈ {h, l},∑
j
σi(pj) = 1.
The buyer’s decisions are based on his belief specified as a function µ : IR+ →
[0, 1] with the interpretation that, after observing price p, the buyer believes
that the seller is of type qh with probability µ(p).
We can express the buyer’s behavior after observing the price p and pos-
sessing some belief µ by the following six actions:
1. Action snn: The buyer does not buy certification nor buy the good.
This action yields the payoff
U(snn|p, µ) = 0.
2. Action snb: The buyer does not buy certification, but buys the product.
This action yields the expected payoff
U(snb|p, µ) = µqh + (1− µ)ql − p.
3. Action sch: The buyer buys certification and buys the product only
when the certifier reveals high quality. This action yields the expected
payoff
U(sch|p, µ) = µ(qh − p)− pc.
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4. Action scb: The buyer buys certification and buys the product irrespec-
tive of the outcome of certification. This action yields the expected
payoff
U(scb|p, µ) = µ(qh − p) + (1− µ)(ql − p)− pc.
Clearly, U(scb|p, µ) < U(snb|p, µ) for any pc > 0 so that the action snb
dominates the action scb.
5. Action scl: The buyer buys certification and buys the product only
when the certifier reveals low quality. This action yields the expected
payoff
U(scl|p, µ) = (1− µ)(ql − p)− pc.
Clearly, U(scl|p, µ) ≤ U(snb|p, µ) for p ≤ qh and U(scl|p, µ) ≤ U(snn|p, µ)
for p > qh. Hence, also the action scl is weakly dominated.
6. Action scn: The buyer demands certification and does not buy the
product. This action yields the expected payoff
U(scn|p, µ) = −pc.
Clearly, U(scn|p, µ) < U(snn|p, µ) for any pc > 0 so that the action scn
is dominated.
To summarize, only the first three actions snn, snb, sch are not (weakly)
dominated for some combination (p, µ). The intuition is straightforward: the
role of certification is to enable the buyer to discriminate between high and
low quality. It is therefore only worthwhile to buy certification when the
buyer uses it to screen out bad quality.5
In the following, we delete the weakly dominated actions from the buyer’s
action space. Consequently, we take the buyer’s action space as S ≡ {snn, snb, sch}.
Since we want to allow the buyer to use a mixed strategy, we let σ(s|p, µ) ∈
5Observe that the strategy sch is not renegotiation proof, because even after certifica-
tion has revealed low quality, gains could be realized by trading the low quality product.
In Section 6, we will consider the simple extension to include renegotiation.
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[0, 1] represent the probability that the buyer takes action s ∈ S = {snn, snb, sch}
given price p and belief µ. Thus
∑
s∈S
σ(s|p, µ) = 1.
A PBE in our subgame Γ(pc) can now be described more specifically: it
is a tuple of functions {σl, σh, µ, σ} satisfying the following three equilibrium
conditions. First, seller type i’s pricing strategy σi must be optimal with
respect to the buyer’s strategy σ. Second, the buyer’s belief µ must be
consistent with the sellers’ pricing strategy, whenever possible. Third, the
buyer’s strategy σ must be a best response given the observed price p and
her beliefs µ.
We start our analysis of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Γ(pc) by study-
ing the third requirement: the optimality of the buyer’s strategy given a price
p and beliefs µ.
Fix a price p¯ and a belief µ¯. Then the pure strategy snn is a best response
whenever U(snn|p¯, µ¯) ≥ U(snb|p¯, µ¯) and U(snn|p¯, µ¯) ≥ U(sch|p¯, µ¯). It follows
that the strategy snn is a best response whenever
(p¯, µ¯) ∈ S(snn|pc) ≡ {(p, µ)|p ≥ µqh + (1− µ)ql ∧ pc ≥ µ(qh − p)} .
Likewise, the pure strategy snb is (weakly) preferred whenever U(snb|p¯, µ¯, pc) ≥
U(snn|p¯, µ¯, pc) and U(snb|p¯, µ¯, pc) ≥ U(sch|p¯, µ¯, pc). It follows that the strat-
egy snb is a best response whenever
(p¯, µ¯) ∈ S(snb|pc) ≡ {(p, µ)|p ≤ µqh + (1− µ)ql ∧ pc ≥ (1− µ)(p− ql)} .
Finally, the pure strategy sch is (weakly) preferred whenever U(sch|p¯, µ¯, pc) ≥
U(snn|p¯, µ¯, pc) and U(sch|p¯, µ¯, pc) ≥ U(snb|p¯, µ¯, pc). It follows that the strat-
egy sch is a best response whenever
(p¯, µ¯) ∈ S(sch|pc) ≡ {(p, µ)|pc ≤ µ(qh − p) ∧ pc ≤ (1− µ)(p− ql)} .
Since a mixed strategy is only optimal if it randomizes among those pure
strategies that are a best response, we arrive at the following result:
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1
qh
p˜
µ˜
p
µ
S(sch)
S(snn)
S(snb)
Figure 1: Buyer’s buying behavior for given pc < ∆q/4.
Lemma 1 In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (σ∗l , σ
∗
h, µ
∗, σ∗) of the sub-
game Γ(pc) we have for any s ∈ S = {snn, snb, sch},
σ∗(s|p, µ) > 0⇒ (p, µ∗(p)) ∈ S(s|pc). (1)
Figure 1 illustrates the buyer’s behavior for a given certification price
pc. For low prices p the buyer buys the good uncertified, (p, µ) ∈ S(snb),
whereas for high prices p the buyer refrains from buying, (p, µ) ∈ S(snn). As
long as pc < ∆q/4 there is an intermediate range of prices p and beliefs µ
such that the buyer demands certification, i.e. (p, µ) ∈ S(sch). In this case,
the buyer only buys the product when certification reveals that it has high
quality. Intuitively, the buyer demands certification to ensure that the highly
priced product is indeed of high quality. Note that apart from points on the
thick, dividing lines, the buyer’s optimal buying behavior of both certification
services and the product is uniquely determined, and mixing does not take
place.
For future reference we define
p˜ ≡
(
qh + ql +
√
∆q(∆q − 4pc)
)
/2
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and
µ˜ ≡
(
1 +
√
1− 4pc/∆q
)
/2.
Note that if the seller prices at p˜ and the buyer has beliefs µ˜, the buyer
is indifferent between all three decisions namely not to buy the good, snn,
to buy the good uncertified, snb, or to buy the good only after it has been
certified as high quality, sch.
We previously argued that the monopolistic certifier benefits from high
buyer uncertainty and an intermediate price of the good. We now can give
precision to this statement. The buyer’s willingness to pay for certification
is the difference between her payoff from certification and the next best al-
ternative, namely either to buy the good uncertified, or to not buy the good
at all. More precisely, given her beliefs are µ, the difference in the buyer’s
expected payoffs between buying the high quality good when certified and
buying any good uncertified is
∆U1 ≡ µ(qh − p)− (q¯ − p).
Similarly, the difference in the buyer’s expected payoffs between buying the
good only when certified and buying the good not at all is
∆U2 = µ(qh − p).
Hence, the buyer’s willingness to pay for certification is maximized for a price
pˆ and a belief µˆ that solves
max
p,µ
min{∆U1,∆U2}.
The solution is µˆ = 1/2 and pˆ = (qh+ql)/2. We later demonstrate that, with
buyer–induced certification, the certifier chooses a price pc for certification
to induce this outcome as closely as possible.
Next, we address the optimality of type i seller’s strategy σi(p). For a
given strategy σ of the buyer and a fixed belief µ, a seller with quality qh
expects the following payoff from setting a price p:
Πh(p, µ|σ) = [σ(snb|p, µ) + σ(sch|p, µ)]p− ch.
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A specific strategy σh yields seller qh, therefore, an expected profit of
Π¯h(σh) =
∑
i
σh(pi)Πh(pi, µ(pi)|σ).
Likewise, a seller with quality ql obtains the payoff
Πl(p, µ|σ) = σ(snb|p, µ)p
and any strategy σl yields
Π¯l(σl) =
∑
i
σl(pi)Πl(pi, µ(pi)|σ).
It follows that in a PBE (σ∗h, σ
∗
l , µ
∗, σ∗) the high quality seller qh and the
low quality seller ql’s payoffs, respectively, are
Π∗h =
∑
i
σ∗h(pi)Πh(pi, µ
∗(pi)|σ
∗) and Π∗l =
∑
i
σ∗l (pi)Πl(pi, µ
∗(pi)|σ
∗),
respectively.
The next lemma makes precise the intuitive result that the seller’s ex-
pected profits increase when the buyer has more positive beliefs about the
good’s quality.
Lemma 2 In any PBE (σ∗l , σ
∗
h, µ
∗, σ∗) of the subgame Γ(pc) with pc > 0 the
payoffs Πh(p, µ|σ
∗) and Πl(p, µ|σ
∗) are non–decreasing in µ.
Seller type i’s pricing strategy σi is an optimal response to the buyer’s
behavior (σ∗, µ∗) exactly if, for any p′, we have
σ∗i (p) > 0 ⇒ Πi(p, µ
∗(p)|σ∗) ≥ Πi(p
′, µ∗(p′)|σ∗). (2)
Because the buyer’s beliefs depend on the observed price p, it affects
the buyer’s behavior and, therefore, the belief function µ∗ plays a role in
condition (2).
Finally, a PBE demands that the buyer’s beliefs µ∗ have to be consistent
with equilibrium play. In particular, they must follow Bayes’ rule:
σ∗i (p) > 0 ⇒ µ
∗(p) =
λσ∗h(p)
λσ∗h(p) + (1− λ)σ
∗
l (p)
. (3)
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The next lemma shows some intuitive implications on PBEs that are due
to Bayes’ rule. In particular, it shows that the seller, no matter his type, never
sets a price below ql, and the low quality seller never sets a price above qh.
The lemma also shows that, in equilibrium, the low quality seller never loses
from the presence of asymmetric information, since he can always guarantee
himself the payoff ql that he obtains with observable quality. By contrast,
the high quality seller loses from the presence of asymmetric information; his
payoff is strictly smaller than qh − ch.
Lemma 3 In any PBE (σ∗l , σ
∗
h, µ
∗, σ∗) of the subgame Γ(pc) we have i) σ
∗
l (p) =
0 for all p 6∈ [ql, qh] and σ
∗
h(p) = 0 for all p < ql; ii) Π
∗
l ≥ ql; iii) Π
∗
h < qh−ch.
As is well known, the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium places only
very weak restrictions on admissible beliefs. In particular, it does not place
any restrictions on the buyer’s beliefs for prices that are not played in equi-
librium; any out–of–equilibrium belief is allowed. However, as is typical for
signalling games, without any restrictions on out–of–equilibrium beliefs we
cannot pin down behavior in the subgame Γ(pc) to a specific equilibrium. Es-
pecially by the use of pessimistic out–of–equilibrium beliefs, one can sustain
many pricing strategies in equilibrium.
In order to reduce the arbitrariness of equilibrium play, it is necessary to
strengthen the solution concept of PBE by introducing more plausible restric-
tions on out–of–equilibrium beliefs. Bester and Ritzberger (2001) demon-
strate that the following extension of the intuitive criterium of Cho–Kreps
suffices to pin down equilibrium play.
Belief restriction (B.R.): A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (σ∗h, σ
∗
l , µ
∗, σ∗)
satisfies the Belief Restriction if, for any µ ∈ [0, 1] and any out–of–equilibrium
price p, we have
Πl(p, µ) < Π
∗
l ∧ Πh(p, µ) > Π
∗
h ⇒ µ
∗(p) ≥ µ.
The belief restriction contains the intuitive criterion of Cho–Kreps as
the special case for µ = 1. Indeed, the underlying idea of the restriction
is to extend the idea behind the Cho–Kreps criterion to a situation where
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a deviation to p is profitable only for the qh seller when the buyer believes
that the deviation originates from the qh seller with probability µ. As we
may have µ < 1, the restriction considers more pessimistic beliefs than the
Cho–Kreps criterium. If such a pessimistic belief µ gives only the qh seller
an incentive to deviate, then the restriction requires that the buyer’s actual
belief should not be even more pessimistic than µ.
The next Lemma establishes characteristics of the equilibrium that are
due to the belief refinement (B.R.). It shows that the belief restriction implies
that the high quality seller can sell his product for a price of at least p˜.
Lemma 4 Any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (σ∗l , σ
∗
h, µ
∗, σ∗) of the subgame
Γ(pc) that satisfies B.R. exhibits i) σ
∗
h(p) = 0 for all p < p˜ and ii) Π
∗
h ≥
p˜− ch.
By combining the previous two lemmata we are now able to characterize
the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 1 Consider a PBE (σ∗l , σ
∗
h, µ
∗, σ∗) of the subgame Γ(pc) that
satisfies B.R. Then
i) for λ < µ˜ and ch < p˜ it exhibits unique pricing behavior by the seller
and unique buying behavior by the buyer. In particular, the high quality seller
sets the price p˜ with certainty and the low quality seller randomizes between
the price p˜ and ql. Observing the price p˜ the buyer buys certification with
positive probability. The certifier’s equilibrium profit equals
Πc(pc) =
λ(p˜− ql)
µ˜p˜
(pc − cc). (4)
ii) For λ > µ˜ or ch > p˜ we have Πc(pc) = 0 in any equilibrium.
iii) For λ ≤µ˜ and ch ≤ p˜ there exists an equilibrium outcome, in which
the certifier’s profits equal expression (4).
The Proposition shows that the buyer and the low quality seller play
the mixed strategies that reflect the typical outcome of an inspection game.
Indeed, by choosing the low price ql a low quality seller honestly signals his
low quality. In contrast, we may interpret a low quality seller, who sets a
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high price p˜, as trying to cheat. Hence, whenever the buyer observes the
price p˜, she is uncertain whether the good is supplied by the high quality
or the low quality seller. She therefore wants the good inspected by buying
certification with positive probability. Through inspection, the buyer tries
to dissuade the low quality seller to set the ”cheating” price p˜. Yet, as in
an inspection game, the buyer has only an incentive to buy certification and
inspect when the low quality seller cheats ”often enough”. This gives rise to
the use of mixed strategies. As in an inspection game the buyer’s certification
probability is such that the low quality seller is indifferent between cheating,
i.e., setting the high price p˜, and honestly signaling his low quality by setting
the price ql. On the other hand, the probability with which the low quality
seller chooses the high price p˜ is such that the buyer is indifferent between
buying the good uncertified and asking for certification.
Proposition 1 also describes the certifier’s profits in the subgame Γ(pc).
The certifier anticipates this outcome when choosing its price pc for certifying
the good’s quality. When the certifier maximizes its profits Πc with respect
to the certification price pc, it must take into account that µ˜ depends on
pc itself and the certifier therefore anticipates that the very case distinction
λ ≶ µ˜ and ch ≷ p˜ depends on its choice of pc. The following proposition
shows that expression (4) is increasing in pc. Hence, the certifier picks the
largest price such that λ ≤ µ˜ and ch ≤ p˜.
Proposition 2 Consider the full game with buyer–induced certification.
i.) Suppose that λ ≤ 1/2 and ch ≤ (qh + ql)/2. Then the certifier sets a
price pbc = ∆q/4 and obtains a profit of
Πbc =
λ∆q
2(qh + ql)
(∆q − 4cc).
ii.) Suppose that λ > 1/2 or ch > (qh + ql)/2. Then the certifier sets the
price pbc = (qh − ch)(ch − ql)/∆q and obtains a profit of
Πbc =
λ[(qh − ch)(ch − ql)−∆qcc]
ch
.
We argued that the monopolistic certifier benefits from a relatively high
uncertainty for the buyer and an intermediate price of the good; we also
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showed that the buyer’s willingness to pay for certification is maximized
for µˆ = 1/2 and pˆ = (qh + ql)/2. A comparison demonstrates that, for the
parameter constellation λ ≤ 1/2 and ch ≤ (qh+ql)/2, the equilibrium induces
exactly this outcome. Indeed, the certifier’s optimal price pc = ∆q/4 leads
to a price p = (qh+ ql)/2 and a belief µ = 1/2 and maximizes the expression
min{∆U1,∆U2}.
For ch > (qh + ql)/2, the price p = (qh + ql)/2 would imply a loss to the
high quality seller and, intuitively, the certifier cannot induce this maximum
degree of uncertainty. For λ > 1/2, the ex ante belief of the buyer about the
product exceeds 1/2. Consequently, the certifier is unable to induce the belief
µ = 1/2. Instead, the certifier is restricted and maximizes the expression
min{∆U1,∆U2} under a feasibility constraint. That is, the certifier’s price
maximizes the buyer’s uncertainty about the seller’s quality and, thereby,
her willingness to pay.
4 Seller Induced Certification
In this section we consider the case where the seller instead of the buyer may
buy certification. Here certification plays a different role. Rather than giving
the buyer the possibility to protect herself from bad quality, it enables a high
quality seller to ascertain the quality of his product to the buyer. Although
the distinction seems small, it has a major impact on the equilibrium out-
come, primarily because only the high quality seller is prepared to demand
certification. Because of this, we can show that seller–induced certification
is simpler and easier to control by the certifier.
Under seller–induced certification the parties play the following game:
t=1 The certifier sets a price pc.
t=2 Nature selects the quality qi, i ∈ {l, h} of the good offered by the seller.
t=3 The seller offering the good at quality qi and cost ci decides about the
price p at which he offers the good.
t=4 The seller decides whether or not to demand certification for his good.
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t=5 The buyer decides whether or not to buy the good.
Thus, in comparison to the model described in the previous section, we
only change stage four by letting the seller, rather than the buyer, decide
about certification. Note that the sequence of stages 3 and 4 is immaterial.
Our setting where the seller first chooses his price and then decides about cer-
tification is strategically equivalent to the situation where he simultaneously
takes both decisions, or reverses their order.
We again focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game. Note again
that after the certifier has set his price pc a proper subgame, Γ(pc), starts
with nature’s decision about the quality offered by the seller. The subgame
Γ(pc) is a pure signalling game if the seller does not buy certification in stage
4. In contrast, if the seller does decide to certify, the quality is revealed to the
buyer, and there is no asymmetric information. In the subsequent subgame,
the qh seller sells his good at price p = qh, whence the low quality seller sells
his good at a price p = ql.
In order to capture the seller’s option to certify, we expand the actions
open to the seller by an action c that represents the seller’s option to certify
and to charge the maximum price qi. Hence, the seller’s payoff associated
with the action c are Πh(c) = qh − ch and Πl(c) = ql for a high and low
quality seller, respectively. Let σi(c) denote the probability that the qi seller
buys certification. We further adopt the notation of the previous section.
Then we may express a mixed strategy of the seller qi over certification and
a, possibly, infinite but countable number of prices by probabilities σi(pj)
such that
σi(c) +
∑
j
σi(pj) = 1. (5)
In contrast to the previous section, the buyer can no longer decide to
buy certification so that her actions are now constrained to snn and snb. As
before let µ(p) represent the buyer’s belief upon observing a non–certified
good priced at p. Consequently, snb is individually rational whenever
µ(p)∆q + ql ≥ p
19
and snn is individually rational whenever
µ(p)∆q + ql ≤ p.
Proposition 3 For any price of certification pc < qh − ch, the equilibrium
outcome in the subgame Γ(pc) is unique. The high quality seller certifies
with probability 1 and obtains the profit Π∗h = qh − ch − pc > 0, whereas the
low quality seller does not certify and obtains the payoff Π∗l = ql. For any
price pc > qh− ch, any equilibrium outcome of the subgame Γ(pc) involves no
certification. For pc = qh−ch, the subgame Γ(pc) has an equilibrium in which
high quality seller certifies with probability 1 and obtains the profit Π∗h = 0,
whereas the low quality seller does not certify and obtains the payoff Π∗l = ql.
The proposition characterizes the equilibrium outcome of the subgame
Γ(pc). From this characterization, we can derive the equilibrium of the overall
game of seller–induced certification.
Proposition 4 The full game with seller–induced certification has the unique
equilibrium outcome pc = qh−ch with equilibrium payoffs Π
s
c = λ(qh−ch−cc),
Π∗h = 0, and Π
∗
l = ql.
Comparing the outcome of seller–induced certification with the outcome
under buyer–induced certification we get the following result.
Proposition 5 The certifier obtains a higher profit under seller–induced
than under buyer–induced certification: Πsc > Π
b
c.
The proposition shows that the certifier is better off when it sells certifica-
tion to the seller. The intuition behind this result is that if the buyer decides
whether or not to certify, the decision to certify cannot be made contingent
on the actual quality. This is different from when the seller has the right
to decide about certification. Clearly, a seller with low quality ql will never
demand certification. In contrast, we showed that, in any equilibrium, the
seller qh always certifies. The intuition is that if seller qh does not certify at
a price pc quoted by the certifier, then the certifier gets zero profits from the
seller. It, therefore, does strictly better by lowering the certification price to
a level where it is worthwhile for the seller to demand certification.
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5 Welfare
Certification enables the high quality seller to sell his good. This obvious
increase in social efficiency obtains both under buyer– and seller–induced
certification. From an efficiency perspective, the differences between the two
regimes relate to differences in the probability at which the low quality good
is sold, and differences in the cases in which costly certification arises.
First, under seller–induced certification the low quality good is always
sold, if offered at all. This is different under buyer–induced certification,
where the good is not sold when the low quality seller picks the high price p˜
and the buyer certifies. This happens with probability
ω = σ∗l (p˜)σ
∗(sch|p˜, µ
∗(p˜)).
Thus, under buyer–induced certification an efficiency loss of ql occurs with
probability (1− λ)ω.
Second, the different regimes may lead to different intensities of certifica-
tion and therefore differences in expected certification costs. In particular,
the probability of certification under buyer–induced certification is
xb = [λ+ (1− λ)σ∗l (p˜)]σ(sch|p˜, µ
∗(p˜)).
Remember that the buyer demands certification only if the seller quotes a
high price. Now, the cornered bracket contains the probabilities at which
the seller quotes that high price, which include the probability λ at which he
sells the high quality product, and the probability (1− λ)σ∗l (p˜) by which he
has a low quality product but quotes the high price.
By comparison, under seller–induced certification the probability of cer-
tification is
xs = λ.
Let WF i, i = b, s denote social welfare under buyer and seller–induced
certification, respectively. As usual, it is defined as the sum of consumer and
producer surplus. Then, social welfare under buyer–induced certification is
WF b = λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)(1− ω)ql − x
bcc,
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whereas social welfare under seller–induced certification equals
WF s = λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)ql − x
scc.
Consequently, the difference in social welfare between the two regimes is
∆WF = WF s −WF b = (1− λ)ωql + (x
b − xs)cc,
In Proposition 5 we have established that the profits of a monopolistic
certifier are larger under seller certification. The certifier will therefore have a
preference for seller–induced certification. We now check whether these pref-
erences are aligned with social efficiency. Clearly, when certification costs are
zero, this follows immediately. The more interesting case is therefore when
the cost of certification, cc, is strictly positive. In this case, the certifier’s
preferences are still in line with social efficiency, when the probability of cer-
tification is smaller under seller–induced certification. In the next lemma we
compare the probabilities of certification in both regimes.
Lemma 5 For λ > 1/2 or ch > (qh + ql)/2 the probability of certification
under seller–induced certification, xs, is lower than under buyer–induced cer-
tification, xb. For λ ≤ 1/2 and ch ≤ (qh+ql)/2 the probability of certification
under seller–induced certification, xs, is higher than under buyer–induced
certification, xb, if and only if qh < 3ql.
The lemma identifies a case where the probability of certification is higher
under seller–induced certification than under buyer–induced certification.
This leaves open the possibility that the decision of a monopolistic certi-
fier to offer its services to the seller rather than the buyer is not in the
interest of social efficiency. In particular, if certification costs, cc, are large,
the certifier’s decision may be suboptimal. Yet, the following proposition
shows that this possibility does not arise. Whenever the certifier’s profit
under buyer–induced certification is non–negative, social welfare is larger
under seller–induced certification, in spite of possibly a higher probability of
certification.
Proposition 6 Social welfare is higher under seller–induced certification
than under buyer–induced certification.
6 Extensions
Our central result that the certifier is better off selling its services to the
better informed party, and that its decision is socially efficient is derived
within a very stylized model. In this section, we informally discuss extensions
in order to show that our result is robust.
To begin, we assumed that, because of the high price, the buyer does not
purchase the good in spite of gains from trade, if certification reveals low
quality. This assumption is realistic as long as the costs of renegotiating the
price after certification are sufficiently high. Yet our results do not depend on
the absence of renegotiation. To see this, suppose renegotiation is costless so
that, after certification, the buyer and a low quality seller always renegotiate
to trade the low quality good at the price p = ql. In this case, the low quality
seller always has an incentive to quote the higher price for the low quality
good before certification, because he is ensured the low quality price even
when the buyer demands certification. Hence, ex post renegotiation actually
worsens the outcome of the inspection game by raising the seller’s cheating
incentives - yet it does not change the outcome of the signalling game.
Our results are also robust to the introduction of imperfect certification
technologies. Consider a certification technology that reveals the correct
quality only with probability π > 1/2, whereas it identifies the wrong quality
with probability 1 − π. Although the imperfect certification technology re-
duces the profitability of buyer–induced certification, it does not qualitatively
change the equilibrium. Intuitively, a less informative certification technol-
ogy shrinks the intermediate area in Figure 1, where S(sch) is optimal, in a
continuous way. Imperfect certification also does not change the nature of the
equilibrium outcome with seller–induced certification. In particular, an equi-
librium exists where the certifier charges the certification price pc = πqh−ch,
the high quality seller certifies and charges the price qh, and the low quality
seller sells the good uncertified at a price ql. The equilibrium is sustained by
a buyer who buys the good at the price qh only if it is certified as of high
quality and, consistent with equilibrium play, only believes that the good
has high quality when it is certified and the price is qh. Hence, as shown
in Strausz (2010) and in contrast to De and Nabar (1991), the equilibrium
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outcome remains separating also with imperfect certification. Consequently,
the equilibrium outcomes under buyer– and seller–induced certification are
continuous in π. As a result, our results are robust to imperfect certification
technologies that are not completely uninformative.
Starting from an industrial organization perspective, we assumed that the
buyer, seller, and certifier can only use unconditional prices rather than so-
phisticated contracts to coordinate their exchange. This raises the question
whether more complicated contracts, such as prices that condition on the
certification outcome, can change our ranking between seller–induced and
buyer–induced certification. As one can formally show with optimal mech-
anism design, this is not the case. The intuition is that with seller–induced
certification, the certifier extracts all the rents from certification, and hence,
the certifier cannot do better than in our context with seller–induced cer-
tification. Stated more formally, the equilibrium payoffs under the optimal
mechanism coincide with the equilibrium payoffs in our certification game
with seller–induced certification.
In the baseline model, the seller can produce only one fixed quality. Sup-
pose alternatively that a high quality producer actually has the choice to
produce alternatively high or low quality, whence a low quality producer can
produce only low quality. In this case, the high quality seller’s next best
alternative to producing high quality and having this certified is to sell low
quality without certification. This changes the outside option of the high
quality seller from zero to ql and limits the certifier’s possibility to exploit
him. Nevertheless, all our qualitative results are upheld. In particular, the
certifier obtains the higher profits from seller–induced certification, because,
as explained in the previous paragraph, it enables it to extract all rents from
certification – even though the rents from certification are now smaller. Sim-
ilarly, welfare is higher under seller–induced certification.
We finally emphasize that the bilateral seller–buyer framework, within
which we have developed our argument, is not crucial. As a particular exam-
ple, consider a setting which applies particularly well to the financial market,
where one seller can sell n units of the good to n identical buyers. Essen-
tially, there are two possible information structures. A first one in which
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buyers cannot share the certification result but each individually must buy
certification. Under buyer certification, our formal results carry through and,
hence, the certifier’s profits are simply multiplied by n. Under seller certifi-
cation, Proposition 3 is changed so that the profits from selling the product
are also multiplied by n, and pc = n[qh − ch]. Because the certifier’s profits
from selling to buyers and sellers are both multiplied by n, both the ranking
of seller–induced vs. buyer–induced certification by the certifier and from a
welfare point of view are as in our baseline model.
The second information structure is one in which buyers collude to collec-
tively initiate certification. Under buyer certification, the market structure
remains as in the baseline model, yet with n times the buyer’s benefit that
can be exploited by the certifier. Under seller certification, the same change
of Proposition 3 takes place as above. Again, the results remain unchanged.
7 Empirical Examples
Our model and results apply one–to–one to situations in which certification
is both product and customer specific. This is the case, for example, in the
automotive industry. We first argue that this industry motivates particularly
well our theoretical model used.6 We then move on to other examples – in
particular to certification in the financial market.
In the automotive industry, most of the development and production of a
complex part for a premium automobile is done by only one supplier — the
seller, whom the automotive producer — the buyer — selects explicitly. Be-
cause the part is customer specific, the buyer–seller relationship is a bilateral
monopoly. Moreover, before the so called null–series production, information
between the buyer and the seller about the quality of the part is asymmet-
ric. The automotive industry provides independent certifiers, whose role is
6The evidence is taken from Mueller et al. (2008), and from a large scale study con-
ducted in 2007/08 by Konrad Stahl et al. for the German Association of Automotive
Manufacturers (VDA) on Upstream Relationships in the Automotive Industry. Survey
participants were car producers and their upstream suppliers. All German car producers
and 13 first tier counterparts were questioned as to their procurement relationships.
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to mediate these information asymmetries.7 Due to significant economies of
scope involving the analytical instruments, the certification industry is highly
concentrated. One of the key test criteria is the fulfilment of safety norms.
It turns out that the testing of car modules and systems is predominantly
performed on the request of the upstream supplier rather than the buyer.
Moreover, the buyer conditions his actual purchase on the quality certifica-
tion. Our model, therefore, captures the procurement relationships in the
automotive industry and our results are consistent with the observations in
this industry.
While our model applies particularly well to cases in which certification
is both product and customer specific, the results also help us understanding
purely product specific certification. Examples of purely product specific
certification range from the certification of foodstuff for production without
herbicides or pesticides; to the certification of toys for production without
aggressive chemicals, to the certification of building materials, or of fire–proof
safes.
A particularly timely and controversially discussed example is certifica-
tion in the financial industry. Before the financial crises was triggered, finan-
cial products were certified by a heavily concentrated rating industry. The
fact that many actual buyers now admit that they poorly understood the
products’ complexities underscores the large degree of asymmetric informa-
tion in this market and the rating agencies’ central role in reducing it. Before
the crisis and consistent with our result, certification was initiated by the is-
suers – the sellers, who paid rating agencies. A controversial claim is that
seller–induced certification led to capture of the certifier and inflated ratings,
which precipitated the financial crisis. Proponents of this claim, therefore,
argue for a regulatory response to transfer the rating decision from sellers to
buyers.
Yet by our results, certification should continue to be initiated by the
7An example is EDAG, an engineering company centering on the development and
prototype–construction of cars, as well as on independent certification of car mod-
ules and systems. In this function it serves all major car producers world wide. See
http://www.edag.de/produkte/prueftechnik/automotive/index html
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sellers, since this has robust welfare superior properties. Given these wel-
fare properties, we caution against regulatory pressure in favor of buyer–
rather than seller–induced certification. Since capture is the issue, regula-
tory initiative should concentrate on directly preventing this, by designing a
certification system in which capture is minimized or excluded. A particu-
larly successful example of this is the German ”Stiftung Warentest” originally
founded by the Federal Government to prevent capture, and later privatized.
Yet the design of an efficient, capture–proof regulatory mechanism addressing
certification in financial markets lies beyond the scope of this paper.
8 Conclusion
Under asymmetric quality information, a demand for certification may arise
from both buyers and sellers. Buyers do not want to be cheated if offered a
good of unknown quality at a high price. In turn, sellers want to offer the
good at a high price – especially if it is of high quality. So to whom does,
and, from a welfare point of view, to whom should a credible certifier sell his
services, to the buyer or to the seller? Within a parsimonious model, we give
straightforward answers to these questions: a certifier does, and should sell
to the better informed party.
While the answers to these questions appear deceptively simple, their jus-
tification needs an elaborate argument. In particular, we show that certifica-
tion to the buyer and certification to the seller play very different economic
roles and lead to different games, namely an inspection game with the typical
mixed strategy equilibrium (which is semi-separating in our context), and a
signalling game with a separating equilibrium, respectively.
Our result is consistent with certification in real life – in particular in
the automobile industry and financial markets. As to the current discussion
about certification in the latter markets, it leads to a clear policy implication.
In contrast to much of the current discussion about transferring the initia-
tion to certify to buyers, we provide an argument in favor of seller–initiated
certification. This may caution policy makers to think of other means to
prevent capture rather than simply reverting from seller– to buyer–induced
certification.
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We also demonstrated the robustness of our results by considering many
extensions. Clearly, further extensions and refinements of the approach are
possible. In order to focus on our central point, we have purposively ex-
cluded seller reactions to certification, such as adapting quality, as this is
discussed in other papers. For the same reason, we also have excluded cer-
tifier capture by the seller. Finally, we excluded competition between many
sellers, or many certifiers. Arguably, the latter is less important, in view of
the technical economies of scale and reputation effects associated with certi-
fication. The former, competition between sellers, enhances sellers’s demand
for certification, but tends not to qualitatively change our insights.
9 Appendix
The appendix contains all formal proofs to our Lemmata and Propositions.
Proof of Lemma 1: Follows directly from the text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: To show that Πh(p, µ|σ
∗) is non–decreasing in
µ we first establish that, in any PBE, σ∗(snn|p, µ) is weakly decreasing in
µ. Suppose not, then we may find µ1 < µ2 such that 0 ≤ σ
∗(snn|p, µ1) <
σ∗(snn|p, µ2) ≤ 1. Lemma 1 implies that (p, µ2) ∈ S(snn|pc). That is,
p ≥ µ2qh + (1− µ2)ql (6)
and
pc ≥ µ2(qh − p). (7)
Now since σ∗(snn|p, µ1) < 1 we have either σ
∗(snb|p, µ1) > 0 or σ
∗(sch|p, µ1) >
0. Suppose first σ∗(snb|p, µ1) > 0, then by Lemma 1 we have p ≤ µ1qh+(1−
µ1)ql. But from µ2 > µ1 and qh > ql it then follows that µ2qh+(1−µ2)ql > p,
which contradicts (6). Suppose therefore that σ∗(sch|p, µ1) > 0, then by
Lemma 1 we have µ1(qh − p) ≥ pc > 0. This requires qh > p. But then, due
to µ2 > µ1, we get µ2(qh − p) > pc, which contradicts (7).
Hence, we establish that σ∗(snn|p, µ) is weakly decreasing in µ and there-
fore σ∗(snb|p, µ)+σ
∗(sch|p, µ) must be weakly increasing in µ. Consequently,
Πh(p, µ|σ
∗) is weakly increasing in µ.
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Next we show that in any PBE σ∗(snb|p, µ) is weakly increasing in µ.
Suppose not, then we may find µ1 < µ2 such that 1 ≥ σ
∗(snb|p, µ1) >
σ∗(snb|p, µ2) ≥ 0. Since σ
∗(snb|p, µ1) > 0, Lemma 1 implies that (p, µ1) ∈
S(snb|pc). That is,
p ≤ µ1qh + (1− µ1)ql (8)
and
pc ≥ (1− µ1)(p− ql). (9)
Now since σ∗(snb|p, µ2) < 1 we have either σ
∗(snn|p, µ2) > 0 or σ
∗(sch|p, µ2) >
0. Suppose first σ∗(snn|p, µ2) > 0, then by Lemma 1 this implies p ≥
µ2qh+(1−µ2)ql. But due to µ2 > µ1 and qh > ql we get p > µ1qh+(1−µ1)ql.
This contradicts (8). Suppose therefore that σ∗(sch|p, µ2) > 0, then by
Lemma 1 we have (1 − µ2)(p − ql) ≥ pc > 0. This requires p > ql. But
then, due to µ2 > µ1, we get (1 − µ1)(p − ql) > pc. This contradicts (9).
Hence, σ∗(snb|p, µ) must be weakly increasing in µ. Consequently, Πl(p, µ|σ
∗)
is weakly increasing in µ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: i) For any p¯ < ql, µ ∈ [0, 1] we have (p¯, µ) 6∈ S(snn),
(p¯, µ) 6∈ S(sch) and (p¯, µ) ∈ S(snb). Hence, σ
∗(snb|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) = 1. Now suppose
for some p¯ < ql we have σ
∗
i (p¯) > 0. This would violate (2), because instead of
charging p¯ seller qi could have raised profits by εσi(p¯) by charging the higher
price p¯ + ε < ql with ε ∈ (0, (ql − p¯)). At p¯ + ε < ql the buyer always buys,
because, as established, σ∗(snb|p¯ + ε, µ) = 1 for all µ and in particular for
µ = µ∗(p¯+ ε).
For any p¯ > qh, µ ∈ [0, 1] we have (p¯, µ) ∈ S(snn), (p¯, µ) 6∈ S(sch)
and (p¯, µ) 6∈ S(snb). Hence, σ
∗(snn|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) = 1. Now suppose we have
σl(p¯) > 0. This would violate (2), because instead of charging p¯ seller ql
could have raised profits by (ql − ε)σl(p¯) by charging the price ql − ε.
ii) Suppose ql − Π
∗
l = δ > 0. Now consider a price p
′ = ql − ε with
ε ∈ (0, δ) then for any µ′ ∈ [0, 1] we have (p′, µ′) ∈ S(snb) and (p
′, µ′) 6∈
S(snn)∪S(sch) so that, by (1), we have σ
∗(snb|p
′∗, µ∗(p′)) = 1 and, therefore,
Πl(p
′∗, µ∗(p′)|σ∗) = p′ > Π∗l . This contradicts (2).
iii) For any p such that σ∗h(p) > 0, we have Π
∗
h = Πh(p, µ
∗(p)|σ∗) =
[σ∗(snb|p, µ
∗(p))+σ∗(sch|p, µ
∗(p))]p−ch. As argued in i), we have σ
∗(snn|p, µ) =
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1 for all p > qh and µ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, Πh(p, µ|σ
∗) = 0 whenever p > qh.
But for any price p ≤ qh we have Πh(p, µ|σ
∗) ≤ qh − ch. Hence, it fol-
lows that Π∗h ≤ qh − ch. Now suppose Π
∗
h = qh − ch. Then we must
have σ∗h(qh) = 1 and σ
∗(snb|qh, µ
∗(qh)) + σ
∗(sch|qh, µ
∗(qh)) = 1. But, due
to µ∗(qh)(qh − qh) = 0 < pc, we have (qh, µ
∗(qh)) 6∈ S(sch|qh) so that
σ∗(sch|qh, µ
∗(qh)) = 0. Hence, we must have σ
∗(snb|qh, µ
∗(qh)) = 1. This
requires (qh, µ
∗(qh)) ∈ S(snb|pc) so that we must have µ
∗(qh) = 1. By (3),
this requires σ∗l (qh) = 0. But since Πl(qh, 1|σ
∗) = σ∗(snb|qh, µ
∗(qh))qh = qh
we must, by (2), have Π∗l ≥ qh. Together with σ
∗
l (qh) = 0, it would require
σ∗l (p) > 0 for some p > qh and leads to a contradiction with i). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: We first prove ii): Suppose to the contrary that
δ ≡ p˜−ch−Π
∗
h > 0. Then, due to the countable number of equilibrium prices,
we can find an out–of–equilibrium price p′ = p˜− ε for some ε ∈ (0, δ). Then
for any belief µ′ ∈ (pc/(qh−p
′), 1−pc/(p
′−ql)) 6= ∅
8 we have (p′, µ′) ∈ S(σch)
and (p′, µ′) 6∈ S(σnn) ∪ S(σnb). Consequently, σ
∗(sch|p
′, µ′) = 1. Hence,
Πh(p
′, µ′) = p′−ch = p˜−ch−ε > p˜−ch−δ = Π
∗
h and Πl(p
′, µ′) = 0 < ql ≤ Π
∗
l .
Therefore, by B.R. the buyer’s equilibrium belief must satisfy µ∗(p′) ≥ µ′.
By Lemma 2 it follows Πh(p
′, µ∗(p′)) ≥ Πh(p
′, µ′) = p˜ − ch − ε > Π
∗
h. This
contradicts (2). Consequently, we must have Π∗h ≥ p˜ − ch. To show i) note
that for all p < p˜ and µ ∈ [0, 1] we have Πh(p, µ|σ) ≤ p − ch < p˜− ch ≤ Π
∗
h
so that σh(p) > 0 would violate (2). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: i): First we show that for λ < µ˜ and ch < p˜
there exists no pooling, i.e., there exists no price p¯ such that σ∗h(p¯) = σ
∗
l (p¯) >
0. For suppose there does. Then, by Lemma 4.i, we have p¯ ≥ p˜ and, by
Lemma 3.i, we have p¯ ≤ qh. Yet, due to (3) we have µ
∗(p¯) = λ < µ˜ so that
ql+µ
∗(p¯)∆q− p¯ < ql+µ˜∆q− p˜ = 0. Moreover, µ
∗(p¯)(qh− p¯) < µ˜(qh− p˜) = pc.
Therefore, σ∗(snn|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) = 1 and Πh(p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) = 0. As a result, σ∗h(p¯) > 0
contradicts (2), because, by Lemma 4.ii, Π∗h ≥ p˜− ch > 0 = Πh(p¯, µ
∗(p¯)).
Second, suppose that for some p¯ > p˜ we have σ∗h(p¯) > 0 then, by definition
of p˜, we have (p¯, µ) 6∈ S(sch) for any µ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, σ
∗(sch|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) = 0
8Let l(p) ≡ pc/(qh − p) and h(p) ≡ 1 − pc/(p − ql). Then by the definition of p˜ we
have l(p˜) = h(p˜). Moreover, for ql < p < qh we have l
′(p) = pc/(qh − p)2 > h′(p) =
pc/(p − ql)
2 > 0. Hence, l(p˜− ε) < h(p˜ − ε) for ε > 0 so that p˜ − ε > ql and, therefore,
l(p′) < h(p′).
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so that Πl(p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) = Πh(p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) + ch. From Lemma 4.ii it then follows
Πl(p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) ≥ p˜ and, therefore,
∑
p≥p˜ σ
∗
l (p) = 1. From p¯ > p˜ and µ˜ > λ it
follows λ∆q+ql−p¯ < µ˜∆q+ql−p˜ = 0 so that λ∆q+ql < p¯. Now take a p¯ > p˜
with σl(p¯) > 0 then, by Lemma 3.ii and (2), 0 < ql ≤ Π
∗
l = Πl(p¯, µ
∗(p¯)|σ∗) =
σ(snb|p¯, µ
∗(p¯))p¯. This requires σ(snb|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) > 0 and therefore (p¯, µ∗(p¯)) ∈
S(snb|pc) and, hence, µ
∗(p¯)∆q+ ql ≥ p¯. Combining the latter inequality with
our observation that λ∆q + ql < p¯ and using (3), it follows
λ∆q + ql <
λσ∗h(p¯)
λσ∗h(p¯) + (1− λ)σ
∗
l (p¯)
∆q + ql,
which is equivalent to σ∗h(p¯) > σ
∗
l (p¯). Summing over all p ≥ p˜ and using∑
p≥p˜ σ
∗
l (p) = 1 yields the contradiction
∑
p≥p˜ σ
∗
h(p) > 1. Hence, we must
have σ∗l (p¯) = 0 for any p¯ > p˜. But this contradicts
∑
p≥p˜ σ
∗
l (p) = 1 and,
therefore, we must have σ∗h(p¯) = 0 for all p¯ > p˜. Hence, if an equilibrium for
λ < µ˜ and p˜ > ch exists then, by Lemma 4, it exhibits σ
∗
h(p˜) = 1, Π
∗
h = p˜−ch
and σ∗(sch|p˜, µ˜) + σ
∗(snb|p˜, µ˜) = 1.
We now show existence of such an equilibrium and demonstrate that any
such equilibrium has a unique equilibrium outcome. If σ∗h(p˜) = 1 then (3)
implies that µ∗(p˜) = µ˜ whenever
σ∗l (p˜) =
λ(1− µ˜)
µ˜(1− λ)
,
which is smaller than one exactly when λ < µ˜. By definition, (p˜, µ˜) ∈ S(sch)∩
S(snb) so that any buying behavior with σ
∗(sch|p˜, µ˜)+σ
∗(snb|p˜, µ˜) = 1 is con-
sistent in equilibrium. In particular, σ∗(snb|p˜, µ˜) = ql/p˜ < 1 is consistent in
equilibrium. Only for this buying behavior we have Πl(ql, 0) = ql = Πl(p˜, µ˜)
so that seller ql is indifferent between price p˜ and ql. The equilibrium therefore
prescribes σ∗l (ql) = 1−σ
∗
l (p˜). Finally, let µ
∗(ql) = 0 and σ
∗(snb|ql, µ
∗(ql)) = 1
and µ∗(p) = 0 for any price p larger than ql and unequal to p˜. This out–of–
equilibrium beliefs satisfies B.R.. Hence, the expected profit to the certifier
is
Πc(pc) = (λ+ (1− λ)σ
∗
l (p˜)) σ
∗(sch|p˜, µ˜)(pc − cc) =
λ(p˜− ql)
µ˜p˜
(pc − cc).
ii) In order to show that, in any equilibrium of Γ(pc), we have Πc(pc) = 0
whenever λ > µ˜, we prove that for any p¯ such that σ∗(sch|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) > 0, it
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must hold σ∗h(p¯) = σ
∗
l (p¯) = 0. Suppose we have σ
∗(sch|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) > 0, then
(p¯, µ∗(p¯)) ∈ S(sch) and, necessarily, p¯ ≤ p˜. But by Lemma 4.i, σ
∗
h(p¯) > 0 also
implies p¯ ≥ p˜. Therefore, we must have p¯ = p˜. But (p˜, µ) ∈ S(sch) only if
µ = µ˜. Hence, we must have µ∗(p˜) = µ˜. By (3) it therefore must hold
µ˜ = µ∗(p˜) =
λσ∗h(p˜)
λσ∗h(p˜) + (1− λ)σ
∗
l (p˜)
.
For λ > µ˜ this requires σ∗h(p˜) < σ
∗
l (p˜) ≤ 1 and therefore there is some other
p′ > p˜ such that σ∗h(p
′) > 0. But if also p′ is an equilibrium price, then
Πh(p˜, µ
∗(p˜)|σ∗) = Πh(p
′, µ∗(p′)|σ∗). Yet, for any p′ > p˜ it holds (p′, µ) 6∈
S(sch|pc) for any µ ∈ [0, 1] so that Πl(p
′, µ|σ∗) = Πh(p
′, µ|σ∗) + ch and,
together with our assumption σ∗(sch|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) > 0 yields Πl(p¯, µ
∗(p¯)|σ∗) <
Πh(p¯, µ
∗(p¯)|σ∗) + ch = Πh(p
′, µ∗(p′)|σ∗) + ch = Πl(p
′, µ∗(p′)|σ∗) so that, by
(2), σ∗l (p¯) = 0. Since p¯ = p˜, this violates σ
∗
l (p˜) > σ
∗
h(p˜) ≥ 0. As a result,
σ∗(sch|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) > 0 implies σ∗h(p¯) = 0.
In order to show that we must also have σ∗l (p¯) = 0, assume again that
σ∗(sch|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) > 0. We have shown that his implies σ∗h(p¯) = 0. Now if
σ∗l (p¯) > 0 then, by (3), it follows µ
∗(p¯) = 0. But then ql + µ
∗(p¯)∆q − p¯ −
pc = ql − p¯ − pc < ql − p¯ so that (p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) 6∈ S(sch), which contradicts
σ∗(sch|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) > 0.
In order to show that p˜ < ch implies Πc(pc) = 0 suppose, on the con-
trary that, Πc(pc) > 0. This requires that there exists some p¯ such that
σ∗(sch|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) > 0 and σ∗i (p¯) > 0 for some i ∈ {l, h}. First note that
σ∗(sch|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) > 0 implies p¯ ≤ p˜. Now suppose σ∗h(p¯) > 0 then Πh(p¯, µ
∗(p¯)|σ∗) =
(σ∗(sch|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) + σ∗(snb|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)))p¯− ch < 0 so that the high quality seller
would make a loss and, thus, violates (2). Therefore, we have σ∗h(p¯) = 0.
Now if σ∗l (p¯) > 0 then (3) implies µ
∗(p¯) = 0 so that σ∗(sch|p¯, µ
∗(p¯)) = 0,
which contradicts Πc(pc) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: In order to express the dependence of µ˜ and
p˜ on pc explicitly, we write µ˜(pc) and p˜(pc), respectively. We maximize ex-
pression (4) with respect to pc over the relevant domain
P = {pc|pc ≤ ∆q/4 ∧ µ˜(pc) ≥ λ ∧ p˜(pc) ≥ ch}.
First, we show that (4) is increasing in pc. Define
α(pc) ≡
λ(p˜(pc)− ql)
µ˜(pc)p˜(pc)
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so that Πc(pc) = α(pc)(pc − cc). We have
α′(pc) =
4λ∆q2√
∆q(∆q − 4pc)
(
qh + ql +
√
∆q(∆q − 4pc)
)2 > 0
so that α(pc) is increasing in pc and, hence, Πc(pc) is increasing in pc and
maximized for maxP .
We distinguish two cases. First, for λ ≤ 1/2, it follows µ˜(pc) ≥ 1/2 ≥ λ.
Therefore,
P = {pc|pc ≤ ∆q/4 ∧ p˜(pc) ≥ ch}.
Hence, maxP is either pc = ∆q/4 or such that p˜(pc) = ch. Because p˜(∆q/4) =
(qh + ql)/2, it follows that for λ ≤ 1/2 and ch ≤ (qh + ql)/2, the maximum
obtains for pc = ∆q/4 with
Πbc =
λ∆q
2(qh + ql)
(∆q − 4cc).
For λ ≤ 1/2 and ch > (qh + ql)/2 the maximum obtains for pc such that
p˜(pc) = ch, which yields pc = (qh − ch)(ch − ql)/∆q with
Πbc =
λ[(qh − ch)(ch − ql)−∆qcc]
ch
;
Second, for λ > 1/2 we have
µ˜(pc) ≥ λ⇔ pc ≤ λ(1− λ)∆q.
Since λ(1−λ) ≤ 1/4 the requirement pc < λ(1−λ)∆q automatically implies
pc ≤ ∆q/4. Hence for λ > 1/2 we have
P = {pc|pc ≤ λ(1− λ)∆q ∧ p˜(pc) ≥ ch}.
Because, p˜(λ(1 − λ)∆q) = λqh + (1 − λ)ql, which by assumption is smaller
than ch, we have maxP = (qh−ch)(ch−ql)/∆q. Note that ch > λqh+(1−λ)ql
and λ > 1/2 implies that ch > (qh + ql)/2. It follows µ˜ = (ch − ql)/∆q and
Πbc =
λ[(qh − ch)(ch − ql)−∆qcc]
ch
;
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3 Fix some pc < qh − ch. By certifying, seller
qh guarantees himself the payoff Πh(c) = qh − ch − pc > 0. Hence, in any
equilibrium of the subgame Γ(pc) seller qh must obtain a payoff of at least
Πh(c) > 0.
Now suppose that there exists some equilibrium in which σh(c) < 1. Then,
by (5) there exists some price p˜ such that σh(p˜) > 0. For p˜ to be optimal,
it is required that Πh(p˜, µ
∗(p˜)|σ∗) = p˜σ(snb|p˜, µ
∗(p˜))− ch ≥ Πh(c) > 0. This
implies Πl(p˜, µ
∗(p˜)|σ∗) = p˜σ(snb|p˜, µ
∗(p˜)) > ch so that the equilibrium payoff
of seller ql is Π
∗
l > ch > q¯. Consequently, σ
∗
l (p) = 0 for any p < q¯ and
therefore
∑
p≥q¯
σ∗l (p) = 1. (10)
But if σ∗l (p) > 0 then we must have pσ(snb|p, µ
∗(p)) > ch. This requires
σ(snb|p, µ
∗(p)) > 0. Therefore, snb must be an optimal response given price
p and belief µ∗(p). Hence, µ∗(p)∆q + ql ≥ p > ch > λ∆q + ql. As a result,
µ∗(p) > λ and, due to (3), it holds σ∗h(p) > σ
∗
l (p) for any σ
∗
l (p) > 0. Together
with (10) we arrive at the contradiction
∑
p≥q¯
σ∗h(p) >
∑
p≥q¯
σ∗l (p) = 1. (11)
It is straightforward to verify that for pc ≤ qh−ch, the strategies σh(c) = 1,
σl(ql) = 1, σ
∗(snn|p, µ) = 1 whenever µ∆q + ql ≥ p and zero otherwise to-
gether with µ∗(p) = ql constitute an equilibrium that sustains the equilibrium
outcome.
For pc > qh − ch, certification would yield seller qh a negative payoff:
Πh(c) = qh − ch − pc < 0. Certification would yield seller ql a payoff Πl(c) =
ql − pc < ql, whereas seller ql could guarantee himself the payoff ql by not
certifying. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, suppose there exists an equilibrium in
which the payoff of the certifier, Π∗c , is strictly smaller than λ(qh − ch − cc).
That is, δ = λ(qh − ch − cc) − Π
∗
c > 0. Now note that the price pc =
qh − ch − δ/2 < qh − ch yields the certifier a payoff λ(qh − ch + δ/2) > Π
∗
c ,
because Proposition 3 shows that its subgame Γ(pc) has the unique outcome
that seller qh always certifies and seller ql does not. Second, note that the
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certifier cannot obtain a profit that exceeds λ(qh− ch− cc), because it would
require that the price of certification exceeds qh − ch or that the low quality
seller certifies with a strictly positive probability. Hence, in any equilibrium
the certifier obtains the payoff λ(qh − ch − cc). According to Proposition 3
the certifier may become this payoff only for pc = qh − ch with σh(c) = 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: For λ ≤ 1/2 and ch ≤ (qh + ql)/2 we have
Πsc = λ(qh − ch − cc) ≥ λ(qh − ch − cc)
qh−ql
qh+ql
≥ λ(qh − (qh + ql)/2− cc)
qh−ql
qh+ql
=
λ(qh − ql − 2cc)
qh−ql
2(qh+ql)
≥ λ(qh − ql − 4cc)
qh−ql
2(qh+ql)
= Πbs, where the second
inequality uses ch ≤ (qh + ql)/2.
For λ > 1/2 or ch > (qh+ ql)/2 it follows that Π
b
c =
λ[(qh−ch)(ch−ql)−∆qcc]
ch
<
λ[(qh−ch)(ch−ql)−(ch−ql)cc]
ch
= λ(qh − ch − cc)
ch−ql
ch
≤ λ(qh − ch − cc) = Π
s
b, where
the first inequality uses qh > ch. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: For λ > 1/2 or ch > (qh + ql)/2, it follows
xbc = (λ+ (1− λ)σ
∗
l (p˜))σ(sch|p˜, µ
∗
h) = λ
∆q
ch
≤ λ = xsc,
where the inequality obtains from qh − ch − cc > ql ⇒ ∆q < ch + cc < ch.
For λ ≤ 1/2 and ch ≤ (qh + ql)/2, it follows
xbc = (λ+ (1− λ)σ
∗
l (p˜))σ(sch|p˜, µ
∗
h) = λ
2∆q
qh + ql
.
Hence, xbc < x
s
c if and only if 2∆q < qh+ql. This yields the condition qh < 3ql.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Due to Lemma 5 we need only check for the
case λ ≤ 1/2 and ch ≤ (qh + ql)/2 and qh < 3ql. According to Proposition
2 the certifier in this case makes non–negative profits exactly when pbc =
∆q/4 ≥ cc. The differences in social welfare for this case is
∆WF = λ
∆q
qh + ql
ql + λ
(
2∆q
qh + ql
− 1
)
cc (12)
=
λ
qh + ql
(∆qql − (3ql − qh)cc) (13)
≥
λ
qh + ql
(∆qql − (3ql − qh)∆q/4) (14)
= λ∆q/4 > 0. (15)
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Q.E.D.
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